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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of federal supremacy has never been very clear. It is a
hornbook proposition that article VI of the Constitution' mandates fed-
eral supremacy over state law where the law of the state "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' This may occur either when there is a clear
conflict between state and federal law or when the state law infringes
on an area specifically reserved by Congress for federal regulation.3
Congressional intent to occupy the field supersedes the operation of
state law on the same subject matter without regard to whether actual
conflict exists between the federal and state statutes. "When Congress
has 'unmistakably. . .ordained' . . . that its enactments alone are to
regulate a part of commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of com-
merce must fall."4 Where the federal law is less clear, either because its
language or its structure and purpose are uncertain, the state law must
still give way to the federal when
[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reason-
able the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it .... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it may
reveal the same purpose.5
Absent actual conflict between the operation of federal and state
law, it is evident that the burden falls upon the judiciary to glean the
intent of Congress in determining whether a particular subject matter
has been federally preempted.6 In doing so, the courts must "start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
1. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
3. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). See also Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 534 (1977).
4. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
5. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
6. Rogers v. Larsen, 563 F.2d 617, 621 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 966 (1978).
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fest purpose of Congress."7 In meeting its constitutional mandate, the
Supreme Court has relied more on its own attitude toward federal-state
relationships than on any consistent application of legal doctrine. At
different times in its history, the Court has variously described the
starting point for applying the supremacy principle. The Warren Court
focused on the federal scheme, Chief Justice Warren himself writing:
"The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material
when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our
Constitution provided that the Federal law must prevail."8 The Burger
Court, however, has described the doctrine of federal supremacy in dif-
ferent terms:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its inten-
tion clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was in-
tended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there
is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal
supremacy is not lightly to be presumed. 9
The most difficult preemption questions arise where the state and
federal laws are aimed at different subject matters, but where the appli-
cation of state law impinges upon a congressionally stated desire to in-
sure a uniform federal regulatory scheme of a particular area of
commerce. As the Court noted in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters,'° "inflexible application of the [preemption] doctrine is to
be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest in regu-
lation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does
not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme."'1
On Labor Day, 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) became law. ERISA imposed a comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation on employee benefit plans, as defined in the Act.
ERISA supersedes all state laws "insofar as they relate to" such em-
ployee benefit plans, with the exception of state laws regulating bank-
ing, securities or insurance.12
Although the broad language of section 514, ERISA's preemption
provision, may appear quite clear upon superficial examination, the
law concerning the extent of ERISA's preemption of state laws remains
unsettled. The definition of employee welfare benefit plans,' 3 and the
7. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230.
8. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
9. New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (citing
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)).
10. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
11. Id at 302.
12. ERISA § 514 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976)).
13. See notes 22, 47-55 infra and accompanying text.
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interaction of ERISA with state pregnancy disability 14 and insurance
laws'I have caused continuing controversy concerning the regulation of
welfare benefit plans. ERISA's regulation of pension plans creates pos-
sible conflicts between ERISA and state community property laws'6 or
state enforcement of support obligations.17 The effect of ERISA on
such state laws, which are not aimed specifically at employee benefit
plans and which operate in traditional areas of state interest, must be
clarified.
The regulatory scheme of ERISA reflects a congressional desire to
provide a uniform federal approach to the regulation of employee ben-
efit plans. Thus, an analysis of ERISA's preemption of the application
of particular state laws requires both an understanding of congressional
purpose and an appreciation of the extent to which a state interest is of
such traditional importance as to permit it to disrupt the congressional
design. This Article will examine the congressional purpose and intent
of ERISA as revealed through statutory language and legislative his-
tory and will discuss the problem areas noted above in light of the judi-
cial interpretation of section 514.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME AND PURPOSE OF ERISA
A. The Statute in Perspective.
ERISA, the culmination of many years of congressional and exec-
utive consideration,'" has three major purposes. In addition to "assur-
ing the equitable character of [employee benefit] plans and their
financial soundness,"' 9 ERISA fosters and protects the growth of such
plans.20
ERISA achieves the first two objectives through a complex and
lengthy statutory scheme that imposes differing burdens on pension2'
14. See notes 57-66 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 56, 70-94 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 104-34 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 135-63 infra and accompanying text.
18. A number of predecessor bills were introduced in Congress in the years prior to enact-
ment of ERISA. The following bills were introduced in 1973 and 1974 before the passage of both
a Senate version of H.R. 2 and a House version of H.R. 2, which were submitted to the Confer-
ence Committee in the spring of 1974: S. 1631, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 12906, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 12855, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 9824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 462, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); H.R. 2, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
20. See notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text.
21. Pension plans subject to ERISA include
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by
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and welfare plans.22 Pension plans covered by ERISA are subject to
detailed statutory requirements including reporting and disclosure to
plan participants and beneficiaries, 23 minimum plan standards for eli-
gibility to participate and for vesting,24 minimum funding standards, 25
and standards of conduct for persons who serve in a fiduciary capacity
to a plan.2 6 This extensive scheme of regulation is enforced by three
federal agencies-the Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue
Service and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation-pursuant to a
plan of enforcement which is sometimes both interrelated and overlap-
ping.27 In contrast to the detailed regulation of pension plans under
ERISA, welfare plans are regulated only by the Department of Labor
pursuant to the provisions of Title I of ERISA.28 The reporting and
disclosure requirements of Part I and fiduciary responsibility standards
of Part IV are, in effect, the only substantive statutory requirements
imposed on welfare plans covered by ERISA.29
its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund or pro-
gram-
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the ter-
mination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the
contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or
the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976)).
22. Welfare plans subject to ERISA include
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization or by both, to the extent that such
plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, acci-
dent, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or
(B) any benefit described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
ERISA § 3(l) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976)).
23. ERISA §§ 101-111 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976)); Vf. I.R.C. §§ 6057-6059
(pension plan registration requirements).
24. ERISA §§ 201-211 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1976)); I.R.C. §§ 410-411 (mini-
mum participation standards for plans qualifying under I.R.C. § 401(a)).
25. ERISA §§ 301-306 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1976)); I.R.C. § 412 (minimum
funding standards for plans qualifying under I.R.C. § 401(a)).
26. ERISA §§ 401-414 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1976)).
27. See Title III of ERISA (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (1976)), which sets out the
statutory scheme of enforcement responsibilities, and the recently enacted Reorganization Plan
No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47713 (1978).
28. Pursuant to the recently enacted Revenue Bill of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763
certain "cafeteria" plans, which offer employees a choice of one or more of a number of taxable or
nontaxable benefits, will be required to meet certain non-discrimination standards under the
Code.
29. Welfare plans are specifically exempted from the participation, vesting and funding stan-
dards established for pension plans. ERISA §§ 201(1), 301(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1),
1081(a)(l) (1976)).
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ERISA serves its third purpose, to foster and protect the growth of
employee benefit plans, through the positive inducement of tax advan-
tage and the negative inducement of avoidance of multitudinous state
laws. ERISA enhanced provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as amended (the Code), which provide for a current deduction
for employer contributions to a qualified pension plan3" and for de-
ferred taxation of employees on amounts contributed on their behalf.31
These positive tax incentives were clearly designed by Congress to en-
courage the growth and maintenance of private pension plans,3z as was
pointed out in a committee report on one of the predecessor bills to
ERISA:
In broad outline, the objective is to increase the number of individu-
als participating in employer-financed plans ....
Essentially your committee's bill represents a significant im-
provement in the tax treatment now applicable with respect to quali-
fied retirement plans. Your committee regards the present legislation
as part of an evolutionary process which keeps this basic framework
but which builds upon it new provisions which experience indicates
are necessary for proper functioning of the plans....
... The committee bill also continues the approach in present
law of encouraging the establishment of retirement plans which con-
tain socially desirable provisions through the granting of tax induce-
ments.
33
The broad preemption of state law in section 514 of ERISA also
plays a critical role in the congressional design to foster and protect the
growth of private employee pension and welfare plans. Employers and
plan administrators are assured of uniform federal regulation rather
than being subjected to the myriad of state laws which could be applied
to an employer maintaining a plan for employees who are located in
several different states. Senator Javits noted the importance of the uni-
form federal regulation which was intended by the breadth of section
514:
[The emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest
30. I.R.C. § 404.
31. Id. §402.
32. As Congressman Ullman stated on the floor of the House during the debates prior to the
enactment of ERISA,
I want to emphasize that the new requirements have been carefully designed to
provide adequate protection for employees and at the same time, provide a favorable
setting for the growth and development of private pension plans. It is axiomatic to any-
one who has worked for any time in this area that pension plans cannot be expected to
develop if costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for employers who generally
foot most of the bill. This would be self-defeating and would be unfavorable rather than
helpful to the employees for whose benefit this legislation is designed. For this reason,
we have been extremely careful to keep costs very moderate.
120 CONG. REc. 29198 (1974).
33. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
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and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans re-
quired ... the displacement of State action in the field of private
employee benefit programs.
It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obli-
gations under private welfare and pension plans.34
B. The Preemption Provision.
ERISA includes in section 514(a) an expansive and seemingly
clear preemption of state regulation:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provi-
sions of this subchapter ["Protection of Employee Benefit Rights"]
and subchapter III ["Plan Termination Insurance"] of this chapter
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in Section
1003(a). . .and not exempt under Section 1003(b). .... 35
On a closer reading, however, section 514 reveals uncertainties as
to the scope of its effect on particular state laws and as to the types of
employee benefit arrangements to which it applies. While the phrase
"insofar as" implies the potential preemption only of particular appli-
cations of state law, the phrase "relate[s] to" implies preemption of the
state law itself. Preemption may be asserted, moreover, only with re-
spect to an "employee benefit plan" covered under Title I, and thus
does not apply to any employee benefits arrangement specifically ex-
cluded from coverage or to other arrangements which may resemble
employee benefit plans in only some respects. Thus, even on its face,
section 514 hints at the complexity of its interpretation.
The language of section 514 specifically "saves" from preemption
state laws regulating insurance, banking or securities. Section
514(b)(2)(A) states that "[elxcept as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking,
or securities."36
To prevent this saving provision from developing into a loophole
through the characterization of plans as insurance providers, banks or
bank investment companies, section 514(b)(2)(B) includes a prohibition
against plans being so deemed:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other
than a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death
34. 120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
36. Id § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies.?
With respect to ERISA's relationship to other federal laws, section
514 contains a specific denial of any preemption:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend,
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States
(except as provided in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of this title) or any
rule or regulation issued under any such law.31
C. The Legislative History of Section 514.
Congress deliberately chose the broad preemption language of
ERISA's section 514, rejecting the narrower scope of preemption pro-
posed in earlier versions of the law. Prior versions limited federal pre-
emption to the substantive areas actually regulated under the
legislation and to the state laws relating to the type of plan (welfare or
pension) covered within a particular area of the federal regulation.39
The crucial change adopted by the Congress was the preemption
of state laws relating toplans covered by ERISA as opposed to subjects
covered by the Act. Section 514, in its final form, resulted in a preemp-
tion of state law insofar as it may relate to employee benefit plans, and
not merely a preemption of state law affecting the specific aspects of
benefit plans which Congress has undertaken to regulate.
The intent of Congress in adopting the present language of section
514 was described in explicit and expansive terms in statements by the
bill's managers prior to enactment. Congressman Dent declared:
Finally I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority
[ofl the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans.
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection af-
forded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and in-
consistent State and local regulation ...
The conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifically enumer-
ated, applied this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-
Federal regulation of employee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions
of section 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision
37. Id § 1144(b)(2)(B).
38. Id § 1144(d).
39. See, e.g., S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a) (as introduced Jan. 4, 1973); H.R. 2, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. § 699 (as passed by the Senate on Mar. 4, 1974); id § 514 (as passed by the House
on Feb. 28, 1974); H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699 (as passed by the Senate on Sept. 19,
1973); H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (as introduced Jan. 3, 1973).
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of any State, subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality
thereof. . . which would affect any employee benefit plan as de-
scribed in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b).4 0
The preemption of state laws that, in Congressman Dent's words,
"affect any employee benefit plan" expresses a broad intent to preempt
the field. It would be a mistake, however, to view statements like those
of Congressman Dent as conclusive evidence of congressional intent
without considering the context in which they were made and the over-
all thrust of what the Congress was attempting to achieve.
The full impact of the conference changes may not have been rec-
ognized by Congress. The final preemption language was a product of
the House-Senate Conference Committee,4' not the usual forum for
congressional deliberation, and has the effect of reversing the language
of both Senate and House bills. Even assuming that most of those who
voted for ERISA's passage42 understood and supported the broad pre-
emption approach, it is not clear whether the Congress fully appreci-
ated the differences in ERISA's regulatory scheme regarding pension
and welfare plans, 43 the import of the saving clauses for state insur-
ance, banking and securities laws,' or the definitional exclusions for
state disability, workmen's compensation and unemployment laws.45
ERISA's limited regulation of welfare plans and broad preemption
provision presented the opportunity for a regulatory vacuum in this
area. However, Congress may have assumed that the proviso in section
5 14(b)(2)(A) and the definitional language in section 514(a) sufficiently
removed any concern regarding the creation of a regulatory vacuum
which might otherwise result from federal preemption of state laws re-
lating to welfare plans.
Nevertheless, it is still quite clear that Congress wished to protect
plans subject to ERISA from the additional burden of varying and pos-
sibly conflicting applications of state law. At the same time, there is no
doubt that Congress intended to preserve some applications of state law
in areas that are traditional subjects of state action-insurance, bank-
ing, securities, workmen's compensation, disability and unemployment
programs. It fell to the courts to apply this mixed intent to the enor-
40. 120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974).
41. When a comparison is made between the bills passed by both the House and Senate, it
can be seen that the present language was drafted by the Conference Committee. See STAFF
CONFERENCE COMM. ON H.R. 2, 93D CONG., IST SESS., SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE SENATE VERSION AND THE HousE VERSION OF H.R. 2, pt. 3, 23-33 (Comm. Print 1974).
42. ERISA was passed by an overwhelming majority in both the House and Senate. The
Senate vote was unanimous and there were only two dissenting votes in the House.
43. See discussion in text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
44. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976)).
45. ERISA § 514(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976)).
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mous variety of employee benefit plans and the myriad of state laws
that relate to them in a host of different ways. In carrying out this
responsibility the courts must apply congressional intent with due re-
gard for the sometimes elusive standards of federal supremacy.
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 514
A. Preemption of State Law Insofar as it Relates to Welfare Plans:
Balancing Equity and Recognizing State Interests.
1. Defining a "Plan. " Before section 514 can be said to preempt
state law or an application of such law the plan affected must be an
"employee benefit plan," as defined in sections 4(a) and (b) of the Act.
ERISA's coverage definitions are purposely vague and broad, carving
out limited exceptions rather than attempting to delineate the exact
scope of coverage.46
The case of multiple employer trusts (METs), also referred to as
employee security benefit associations (ESBAs),47 exemplifies the bal-
ancing approach taken by the courts in distinguishing between a state
law which relates to a plan and a state insurance law. If METs are
viewed as employee benefit plans rather than as insurance providers,
section 514 would preempt any state attempt to regulate such arrange-
ments. Self-funded METs48 lack the contingency reserves of insurance
companies. Because ERISA does not regulate the funding of welfare
plans, a MET which is not subject to state insurance regulation is virtu-
ally unregulated. Thus a broad interpretation of the definition of em-
ployee welfare benefit plans, including METs, could prevent state
regulation in areas where there is no federal substitute.
46. See ERISA §§ 3(1)-(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(l)-(2) (1976)), quoted in notes 21-
22 supra, and the regulations thereunder at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-1, 2510.3-2 and 2510.3-3 (1977).
47. Under a MET a number of otherwise unrelated small employers typically join together to
provide benefits, whether insured or uninsured, which are similar to those offered by larger em-
ployers. A third party administrator is frequently used as a vehicle through which employer con-
tributions may be pooled. The court in Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382
(D. Kan. 1977) cited a number of factors that distinguish a MET from an employee benefit plan,
such as the absence of an employer-employee relationship, a profit motive and solicitation. An
employee benefit plan, unlike a MET, is provided by an employer, a union or a joint board of
trustees, is noncommercial in nature and is not promoted by public solicitation.
48. Under a fully insured MET, ERISA's preemption of state regulation would not have the
same potential for adverse effects for participants as would preemption of state regulation in the
case of a self-funded plan. Participants in a fully insured plan would still be afforded some protec-
tion from loss despite the immunity of the MET from state regulation. A fully insured MET
would be funded by an insurance contract which would normally be subject to state regulation of
reserves and underwriting practices. On the other hand, a self-funded MET which is not subject
to any state regulation would not provide the same protections because of the absence of any
substantive funding or reserve requirements for welfare plans covered by ERISA.
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In Bell v. Employee Security Benet Association49 the court both
recognized and reaffirmed the breadth of section 514, while limiting its
application to arrangements of this kind. Concerned that section 514
might result in the creation of a regulatory vacuum, the court stated
that "[o]ur conclusion is that just as a state cannot regulate an 'em-
ployee benefit plan' by calling it 'insurance,' neither can defendants
merchandise an insurance program, free of state regulation, by terming
it an 'employee benefit plan.' "50 The court in Bell identified the char-
acteristics of an ESBA and distinguished them from the characteristics
of an employee benefit plan, concluding that the "ESBA is marketing
disguised insurance."'" The facts in Bell, particularly the absence of
employer participation and the entrepreneurial nature of the ESBA,
lend credence to the court's approach. Through this "facts and circum-
stances" approach to the definition of an employee benefit plan, the
court balanced the broad congressional statement of preemption in sec-
tion 514 and the need to preserve state primacy in an area not ade-
quately regulated by ERISA.5 2
In Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp.53 the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that a
MET was a plan, not an insurance provider, thereby rendering state
laws regulating insurance impotent as to the MET. In that case, an
49. 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
50. Id at 390.
51. Id at 392. For other cases which dealt with the issue of METs see Hamberlin v. VIP
Insurance Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977) and NBCEBA v. Howatt, [1978] 179 PENS.
REP. (BNA) D-4 (D. Ore. 1977). The courts in both Hamberlin and Howatt found that the METs
in question were not employee benefit plans covered by ERISA and were, therefore, subject to
state insurance regulation. In Howait the court noted that the National Business Conference Em-
ployee Benefit Association was essentially the same program as that considered by the court in
Bell. The absence of a commonality of employment status among the covered members of the
association resulted in a finding that these associations or METs were not ERISA-covered em-
ployee benefit plans. In Hamberlin the court found that the VIP multiple employer trust, which
had originally been fully insured but subsequently became self-insured, was an entrepreneurial
enterprise operated for profit and was not an employee benefit plan. The court noted that the
insurance brokers who had originally established the plan converted it to a self-insured trust after
the insurance company had cancelled its coverage so that they (the brokers) could continue to
receive their commissions. As in Bell and Howatt, the court found that an entrepreneurial profit-
making arrangement which provided benefits to a group of unrelated employees was not the type
of arrangement Congress had intended to include within the definition of an employee benefit
plan.
52. The court was aided in its analysis by a report of the House ERISA Oversight Task Force
which concluded that METs "are not established or maintained by the appropriate parties to
confer ERISA jurisdiction, nor is the purpose for their establishment or maintenance appropriate
to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Act." ACTIvITY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REp. No. 1785, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1976).
53. 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), af'd, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
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employer, Wayne Chemical, purchased a group medical insurance pol-
icy for its employees from the Columbus Agency Service Corporation
(CASCO), which was agent for the National Multiple Employee Foun-
dation (NMEF), a MET, and Association Life Insurance Company.
The policy, originally underwritten by Association Life, was later
transferred from the insurance company to the MET. An employee of
Wayne Chemical filed a claim under the policy on behalf of his 18-year
old son, who had suffered injuries requiring extensive medical care for
an extended period, and was told that benefits would terminate on his
son's twentieth birthday. Indiana state insurance law prohibited such
termination. By finding that the MET in question was an ERISA-cov-
ered employee benefit plan, however, the court effectively preempted
the application of state insurance law. The court avoided the unfortu-
nate result which such a finding demanded by adopting the applicable
provision of the Indiana state insurance law as federal common law. 4
Thus, coverage continued and the regulatory vacuum created by sec-
tion 514 was filled.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in Wayne
Chemical,5" but on different grounds. The Seventh Circuit found that
the employer, Wayne Chemical, Inc., never subscribed to an employee
benefit plan as such, but merely sought to purchase insurance to pro-
vide the benefits promised to its employees. Although an NMEF "Plan
and Trust Agreement? existed, it was unsigned and there was no credi-
ble evidence of its involvement in the employer's insurance transaction.
Thus, NMEF sold insurance directly to the employer, not to an em-
ployee benefit plan, and it was the insurance contract, not the terms of
an employee benefit plan, which contained the provisions offensive to
Indiana law. By so constituting the facts, the court was led to hold first,
that the medical coverage provided to Wayne Chemical's employee
was not provided by an employee benefit plan and second, that the
applicable Indiana law prohibiting termination of coverage was an in-
surance law saved from preemption by section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA.
By construing thetransaction as a simple sale of insurance the Seventh
Circuit avoided the necessity of formulating federal common law to fill
in the regulatory void that would have been caused by preemption.
2. Defning the Scope of Preemption and the "Saving" Clauses.
Having determined whether a particular benefit program is an em-
ployee benefit plan under ERISA, a court must next decide whether the
state law in question "relates to" the employee benefit plan and, if it
54. Id at 325.
55. 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
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does, whether it is a law regulating insurance, banking or securities so
as to be saved from federal preemption. 6
The issue of whether a state law or a particular application of a
state law relates to an employee benefit plan so as to be preempted by
ERISA has been raised in several decisions that have upheld provisions
of state equal employment opportunity laws requiring coverage of
pregnancy under employers' disability plans. In Time Insurance Co. v.
Department of Industry Labor and Human Relations57 a Wisconsin
court found the Wisconsin Fair Employment Law sex discrimination
provisions to be "merely of peripheral concern of ERISA"' 58 and held
that ERISA does not preempt the state law "until the United States
Supreme Court rules to the contrary."5 9 The court's decision did not
engage in any analysis of ERISA's preemption language, and relied
primarily on the state's broad police power to prevent employers from
engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis
of sex.
A federal district court in Wisconsin similarly upheld the Wiscon-
sin Fair Employment Act against a challenge of ERISA preemption in
Bucyrus Erie Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Rela-
tions.60 With little analysis of ERISA's preemption provisions, the
court found that a presumption in favor of the state's historic police
powers had not been overcome by ERISA's regulation of employee
benefit plans, an area which is separate from, although sometimes over-
lapping, the area regulated by the state's fair employment law. The
court traced the development of federal preemption and concluded,
like the Burger Supreme Court, that "it is clear that state statutes are
presumed to be valid unless Congress clearly intended these statutes to
be superseded by federal law."'6' With respect to ERISA's preemption
of a state's fair employment law, the court pointed out that "[t]he legis-
lative history of the Act fails to indicate that Congress, by enacting
ERISA, intended to preempt state fair employment laws as they may
concern employee benefit plans." 62
In a third decision, Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,63 a Penn-
56. For an early but thoughtful discussion of ERISA's "relates to" language and the insur-
ance proviso and their effect on state insurance laws see generally Brummond, FederaltPreemption
ofState Insurance Regulation Under ERIS14, 62 IowA L. REV. 57 (1976).
57. [1978] 174 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-9 (Cir. Ct., Dane County, Wis. 1978).
58. Id at D-12.
59. Id
60. [1978] 198 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-7 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
61. Id at D-8.
62. Id
63. No. GD 77-14803, slip op. at 7 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Apr. 20, 1978).
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sylvania state court held that ERISA does not preempt Pennsylvania's
Human Relations Act,64 which prohibits sex-based discrimination
under an employer's disability plan. The court reasoned "that ERISA
was intended to guarantee uniform administration of the regulation
and operation of employee benefit plans and not the content thereof."65
These opinions do not engage in extensive analysis of ERISA's
preemption language or the "relates to" limitation; rather they rest
their arguments on strongly held notions of state primacy in matters
involving the broad police power to prevent discriminatory employ-
ment practices. By denying preemption of a state statute which regu-
lates the substantive coverage of an employer's disability plan, these
decisions would narrow ERISA's scope of preemption.6 It may well
be that the Congress, when it enacted ERISA, was unaware of the
reach of section 514. As indicated above,67 at least with regard to wel-
fare plans, Congress may not have appreciated the full potential of its
decision to "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan 68 covered by ERISA
and not otherwise specifically saved from preemption. However, the
statutory language is clear and the legislative history supports its broad
scope of preemption.
Although it is appropriate for the courts to balance a state's inter-
est in maintaining its traditional police powers against the federal inter-
ests served by a federal statute as described in its legislative history,
these decisions do not properly balance the state and federal interests.
They fail to recognize and describe properly the intent of Congress in
64. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-62 (Supp. 1978).
65. No. GD 77-14803, slip op. at 7. In addition to the argument that state fair employment
laws do not relate to employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514, the court in Westing-
house Electric found that preemption would violate § 514(d), which provides that ERISA is not to
impair the operation of any other federal statute. The Court found that the creation of the state's
fair employment law, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-62 (Supp. 1978) is implicitly recognized under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). The court rea-
soned that ERISA's preemption of the state's equal employment law would "in effect make Title
VII's mandatory 60 day deferral to state fair employment laws meaningless," No. GD 77-14803,
slip op. at 7, and would obliterate the "Congressional mandate that the EEOC cooperate with
state agencies and accord substantial weight to their findings and orders." Id
66. But see Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus., [1978]
210 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-I (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1978). In that case the court held that ERISA
preempts the state statute dealing with maternity leave policies. The Montana court rested its
decision on the congressionally stated need for uniform regulation of multistate employee benefit
plans such as the Mountain Bell welfare plan. Accord, Pervel Indus., Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n
on Human Rights and Opportunities, Civil No. H-78-459 (D. Conn. 1978) (ERISA preempts Con-
necticut's anti-discrimination law insofar as it requires the inclusion of pregnancy disability bene-
fits under an ERISA covered welfare plan).
67. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
68. ERISA § 514 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976)).
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enacting section 514 of ERISA. The state interest must be balanced
against the intent of Congress as reflected in the language of the federal
statute. Absent a reasonable construction of that language and its legis-
lative history which leaves room for state action, the federal law must
be found to be supreme.
There may be room for state action regarding pregnancy disability
laws; however, the statutory language and legislative history of section
514 do not provide a clear guide as to congressional intent with respect
to such laws. Section 514(a) saves from preemption a state law that
relates to an employee benefit plan described in section 4(b). Section
4(b)(3) provides that ERISA does not apply to plans maintained solely
for the purpose of complying with state disability insurance laws.69
Therefore, the description given to a particular state law could be criti-
cal. For example, ERISA would not preempt a state disability insur-
ance law imposing substantive coverage requirements, such as
pregnancy disability coverage, on an employee welfare benefit plan
maintained to comply with that insurance law; the plan is excluded
from ERISA's coverage definitions by section 4(b). On the other hand,
a state's equal employment opportunity law, which imposes certain
pregnancy disability coverage requirements on employers within the
state, could be preempted as a state law that relates to employee benefit
plans. Congress must clarify its intent in this area to enable the courts
to balance correctly the federal and state interests.
In contrast to the pregnancy disability decisions, the federal court
rulings that have addressed the scope of ERISA's saving clause for
state insurance, banking and securities laws contain a more detailed
analysis of the scope of preemption, underscoring more forcibly the
need for congressional clarification.
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,7" the District Court for the
Northern District of California held that ERISA preempted Califor-
nia's Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act.7 ' The Knox-Keene
Act's provisions sought, among other things, to expand upon ERISA's
regulation of employee benefit plans in such areas as funding, disclo-
sure, sales practices and the quality of services provided. Thus the
Knox-Keene Act directly infringed on areas explicitly regulated by ER-
ISA, and did not require the court to adopt an expansive view of the
scope of ERISA's preemption. Judge Renfrew dismissed the state's
contention that the phrase "relates to" in section 514 is either "vague"
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1976).
70. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aft'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
108 (1978).
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1345 (West Supp. 1978).
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or "ambiguous": "[TIhe Court doubts that Congress could have chosen
any more precise language to express its intent to preempt a state stat-
ute such as Knox-Keene insofar as it seeks to regulate ERISA covered
employee benefit plans such as those maintained by plaintiffs. 72
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Renfrew's decision in Hewlett-
Packard." After concluding that the scope of ERISA's "relate[s] to"
language must be at least broad enough to preempt a state statute
which imposes regulatory standards in the areas covered by ERISA,
the court held that ERISA's preemption of the Knox-Keene Act would
not impair other federal legislation in violation of section 514(d) of the
Act. With respect to the Health Maintenance Organization Act
("HMO Act")74 the court stressed that ERISA preempts the Knox-
Keene Act only insofar as it applies to employee benefit plans, not
health maintenance organizations. Thus, preemption under section 514
would not interfere with the concurrent state and federal regulatory
scheme envisioned under the HMO Act. Similarly, the court rejected
appellant's argument that preemption interfered with the McCarran-
Ferguson Act," which requires that ERISA or any federal law not be
construed in a manner which violates the policy of reserving to the
states the authority to regulate insurance unless that federal law "spe-
cifically relate[s]" to insurance.7 6 The court noted that sections of ER-
ISA undeniably do relate specifically to the business of insurance.77
The court also reasoned that ERISA's deemer clause, "which states that
an employee benefit plan shall not be deemed to be engaged in the
business of insurance," prevented any conflict with the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act.78 The court thus rejected the challenge to ERISA preemp-
tion based on the section 514(d) prohibition against the impairment of
any other federal law.
Judge Renfrew, in Standard Oil Co. of Caiffornia v. Agsalud,79
adopted an expansive interpretation of ERISA's preemption, not limit-
ing it to those state laws that directly affect areas regulated by ERISA.
The court held that Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act8 0 was preempted
by ERISA. Although the Hawaii statute, which required that workers
in the state be covered by a comprehensive prepaid health care plan,
72. 425 F. Supp. at 1297.
73. 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-15 (1976).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
76. Id § 1012(b).
77. Hewlett-Packard, 571 F.2d at 505.
78. Id
79. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
80. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1976).
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including coverage for alcohol and drug abuse, could have been char-
acterized as a state insurance law saved from preemption, the decision
emphasized the "relates to" language of section 514 in finding preemp-
tion. The Hawaii statute was held to be preempted despite the fact that
ERISA does not impose any substantive requirements regarding the
content or coverage of prepaid health plans. The argument of the State
of Hawaii that preemption should be found only when the state at-
tempts to regulate areas covered by ERISA was specifically rejected by
the court:
Insofar as the Hawaii Act does not regulate matters covered by ER-
ISA (basically reporting, disclosure, funding, vesting, and fiduciary
duties) it would not, under this interpretation, be superseded because
it does not relate to employee benefit plans in any of the ways that
ERISA relates to employee benefit plans .... Under this interpre-
tation, Hawaiian workers would obtain the protection of both the
Hawaii Act which regulates benefits, but not administration, and
ERISA which regulates administration but not benefits. However
wise Congress might have been to take this approach to preemption
of state laws regulating employee benefit plans, Congress clearly re-
jected it.8 '
Hewlett-Packard and Agsalud can be contrasted with Wadsworth v.
Whaland.82 In Wadsworth, the First Circuit circumscribed the focus of
ERISA's preemption provisions and upheld state primacy in the regu-
lation of insurance under the insurance proviso in section 514(b)(2)(A).
Wadsworth involved a New Hampshire statute83 that prescribes the
content of group health insurance policies issued within the state, in-
cluding policies issued to employee benefit plans, by requiring that is-
suers of such policies provide coverage for the treatment of mental
illness and emotional disorders. While admitting that the legislative
history of ERISA indicates an intent "to preempt all state laws that
relate to employee benefit plans and not just state laws which purport
to regulate an area expressly covered by ERISA,' ' 4 the court held that
preemption does not necessarily follow from a finding that a state stat-
ute indirectly relates to an employee benefit plan.
When a state statute both regulates insurance law and indirectly
81. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. at 706-07.
82. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978). The Ninth Circuit in Hew-
leu-Packard directs our attention to Wadsworth with a compare citation, 571 F.2d at 505.
83. Each insurer that issues or renews any policy of group or blanket accident or health
insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses, shall provide to each
group, or to the portion of each group comprised of certificate holders of such insurance
who are residents of this state and whose principal place of employment is in this state,
coverage for expenses arising from the treatment of mental illnesses and emotional disor-
ders.
N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-(a)(I) (1976).
84. Wadsworth, 562 F.2d at 77 (emphasis in original).
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relates to an employee benefit plan, the court in Wadsworth found that
the conflict must be resolved by application of the "deemer" clause of
section 514(b)(2)(B)Y5 The plaintiffs, administrators of various health
and welfare plans, contended that the "deemer" clause prohibiting a
state from deeming an employee benefit plan to be an insurance com-
pany, denies a state the ability to affect plans indirectly by regulating
the content of the insurance policies they purchase. The court rejected
this construction of the "deemer" clause because it would "greatly di-
minish the state's primacy in regulating insurance," 6 an object clearly
protected both by section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA and by the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act.
The First Circuit opinion in Wadsworth agreed with the district
court's finding in Hewlett-Packard that "the deemer provision prevents
a state from subjecting a plan, as a business of insurance, to the state's
general insurance laws or enacting special legislation regulating plans
as 'a unique variety of insurance.' "87 But the Wadsworth court dis-
tinguished Hewlett-Packard, stating that "on its face the deemer provi-
sion does not prohibit a state from indirectly affecting plans by
regulating the contents of group insurance policies purchased by the
plans."88 In fact, the First Circuit's opinion provides little guidance in
determining when a state's insurance law is a guise to regulate em-
ployee benefit plans and when such a law is a legitimate exercise of the
authority reserved to the state to regulate insurance, which indirectly
affects an employee benefit plan.
In Hewlett-Packard, the court denied the right of a state to regu-
late employee benefit plans through the device of regulating insurance;
in Wadsworth, the court denied federal preemption of a state insurance
law merely because it affects employee benefit plans. In Hewlett-Pack-
ard, the court referred to the state action as a "direct" regulation of
employee benefit plans; in Wadsworth, the court described the state ac-
tion as an "indirect" regulation of such plans. If these two cases are to
be reconciled, the apparent distinction is in the manner in which the
laws "relate to" employee benefit plans: the New Hampshire law chal-
lenged in Wadsworth regulates group health insurance policies and
mandates substantive items of coverage, while the California law ad-
dressed by the Hewlett-Packard court regulates "health care service
plans" and mandates non-substantive aspects of plan administration.
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Hampshire statute does not. Given ERISA's stated respect for state
primacy in the area of insurance regulation, a direct trespass may be
worthy of preemption-at least in the Ninth Circuit-but an indirect,
yet substantial, economic burden on plans is not-at least in the First
Circuit.
Judge Renfrew's decision in Agsalud may also be reconciled with
the First Circuit's holding in Wadsworth under a similar rationale. The
Hawaii statute which was preempted in Agsalud applied to employee
benefit plans directly and mandated certain coverage provisions. By
comparison, the New Hampshire statute mandated the coverage of all
group health insurance policies issued within the state, of which poli-
cies sold to employee benefit plans constituted only one subset or classi-
fication. The broader applicability of the New Hampshire statute may
have made the First Circuit more reluctant to strike down the state's
exercise of traditional authority.
In an opinion which followed the rationale in Wadsworth, a Min-
nesota federal district court in Insurers'Action Council v. Heaton9 re-
fused to find preemption of Minnesota's Comprehensive Health
Insurance Act.9° The Act requires that every health insurer offer Min-
nesota residents policies including a specified amount of major medical
coverage; that employer sponsors of health care plans make available a
plan providing the statutorily mandated benefits, regardless of whether
such plans are funded through insurance contracts; and that a state
Health Association be created to offer policies to individuals otherwise
unable to obtain health and medical insurance. The court cited the
insurance proviso in section 514(b)(2)(A), asserting that "the conflict
between the challenged state insurance law and ERISA has to be very
clear in order to trigger the preemption provision." 91 The court further
noted that the only substantive provisions of ERISA which relate to
health and accident insurance plans, or to welfare plans generally, are
reporting and disclosure requirements. These provisions do not pur-
port to regulate "the substance of the insurance plans which employers
must offer their employees. 92 Thus, the substantive provisions of ER-
ISA did not result in sufficient conflict with the substantive require-
ments of the Minnesota insurance law to warrant preemption.
In light of this minimal interference with an area of traditional
state primacy, the court cited section 514(d) of ERISA in support of its
conclusion that ERISA "shall not be construed to supersede any law of
89. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
90. 1976 MINN. LAWS. Ch. 296.




the United States," 93 including the McCarran-Ferguson Act which
"mandates that the business of insurance shall be regulated by the
states." 94 The court in Heaton went further than the First Circuit in
Wadsworth by upholding the state law in its entirety, including the pro-
vision that applied specifically to employer sponsors of health care
plans, regardless of whether such plans are funded through insurance
contracts. Insofar as the state law regulates insurance, the Wadsworth
rationale and the deemer provision of section 514(b)(2)(B) are forceful
arguments in favor of state primacy. But, insofar as the state statute
attempts to regulate employee benefit plans directly, by imposing sub-
stantive requirements on plan sponsors, it would appear to be outside
the umbrella of permissible state action, as evidenced by the language
of section 514.
This line of cases, which attempts to distinguish a state insurance
law from a state law which relates to employee benefit plans, is trouble-
some. The courts appear generally to have interpreted a state law to be
a non-preempted insurance law so long as it affects employee benefit
plans only indirectly. A state law is presumably saved from preemp-
tion if it is couched in terms of overall insurance regulation, because
employee welfare benefit plans are only one category-although a
fairly large category-of entities affected by a law that regulates, for
example, all group health insurance policies issued in the state. Yet the
courts have in fact given little guidance in determining when a state
law which is merely labeled as an "insurance law" may be a guise to
regulate employee benefit plans and when such a law is a legitimate
exercise of the state's traditional authority in the area of insurance, an
area which Congress specifically chose to reserve to the states.
In the absence of congressional clarification, the states appear to
be left with the authority to regulate indirectly the substantive coverage
of employee welfare benefit plans. If Congress intended areas such as
the substantive coverage of welfare plans to be reserved to the states
through the insurance proviso, then the outcome of these judicial deci-
sions is not disturbing. It should be noted, however, that this result
seriously undermines ERISA's preemption provisions. The ability of
each state to mandate the substantive coverage of welfare plans,
through the regulation either of group insurance policies issued within
the state or of the benefits provided to policy holders within the state,
would impair the congressional goal of uniformity of regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans.
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welfare and pension plans through the section 514 preemption lan-
guage, the insurance proviso provides insufficient guidance. Because
the overlap and interface between insurance and employee benefit
plans-particularly employee welfare benefit plans-are so great, Con-
gress should reexamine its goals with respect to state insurance regula-
tion. If the congressional policy underlying the McCarran-Ferguson
Act is found to be dominant, then a certain degree of uniformity in the
regulation of employee welfare benefit plans must be lost. If, however,
federal law alone must regulate employee welfare benefit plans, a fur-
ther statement of congressional intent is necessary.
The label placed on a state law, whether it be insurance regulation,
fair employment law or disability insurance regulation, should not be
the determinative factor in balancing competing state and federal is-
sues under the preemption doctrine. Congress should clarify its intent
with respect to these two areas affecting welfare plans so that the courts
can properly balance the state and federal interests without being influ-
enced by a superficial label.95
B. Preemption of State Law "Insofar as it Relate[si to" Retirement
Plans: The Federal Interest in the Integrity of the Retirement Fund
versus the State Interest in the Welfare of its Citizenry.
1. The Uniqueness of Retirement Benets: The Pre-ERISA Fed-
eral Cases. Both legislation and judicial rulings have traditionally
treated retirement benefits differently from other forms of employee
benefits. More than health, life insurance or other types of benefits,
retirement or pension benefits have been thought essential to employ-
ees' financial security. Federal courts have often been willing to find
preemption of state law where to do so was to promote the federal in-
terest of guaranteeing federally provided retirement funds against op-
posing claims under state law.
Philpott v. Essex County Wefare Board96 involved a potential con-
95. The ERISA Improvements Act of 1979, S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., represents an at-
tempt by Congress to clarify its intent with regard to the meaning of the insurance proviso of
§ 514(b)(2)(B). Section 155 of the bill would amend § 514 of ERISA to provide that a state insur-
ance law which requires that a particular benefit be provided by an insurer selling policies to
employee benefit plans covered by ERISA is preempted and not saved under § 514(b)(2)(B).
However, a state law which directly or indirectly requires that employers provide certain health
care benefits or services to their employees would not be preempted, nor would a state law which
regulates the administration of arrangements under which health care benefits or services are pro-
vided. Thus, state laws which impose substantive coverage requirements for health care plans or
regulate the administration of an employer's health care program or arrangement would not be
preempted. A variety of differing state laws could, under this provision, be applicable to a multi-
state plan.
96. 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
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flict between the Social Security Act and a New Jersey law which pro-
vided for the reimbursement of welfare funds. The Supreme Court
held that the fixed prohibition in the Social Security Act against the
assignment or alienation of benefits97 preempted the state law. The
Court prevented the welfare board from enforcing a reimbursement
agreement signed by the welfare recipient and thus refused to permit
the welfare board to reach the bank account in which the recipient had
deposited disability payments received under the Social Security Act.
Federal courts have also protected the integrity of federally pro-
vided retirement benefits against conflicting claims of third parties
based on state community property laws. For example, in Wissner v.
Wissner98 the Supreme Court held that the provision in the National
Service Life Insurance Act, exempting payments from attachment or
levy, preempted the application of state community property statutes.
The Court found that the law's exemption of proceeds from alienation
or assignment was "in fiat conflict with" and therefore superseded any
California community property law which would divide the proceeds
either before or after payment. The Court cited the need to protect the
integrity of the fund in support of its finding of federal preemption.99
In balancing the federal and state interests, the Court noted that al-
though "venerable and worthy," community property principles do not
"justify an exception to the congressional language."'0
Similarly, in Free v. Bland °" the Supreme Court held that an ap-
plication of Texas community property principles must be superseded
by Treasury Department regulations which created a right of survivor-
ship in the co-owners of United States Savings Bonds. The Court re-
jected a claim of the son of the deceased spouse, holding that the state's
community property law could not be applied so as to defeat the feder-
ally granted sole ownership rights of the surviving spouse. In balancing
the state and federal interests the Court took a strong stand on the side
of federal preemption. 02
ERISA includes within its detailed scheme of pension plan regula-
tion a number of specific statutory provisions designed to promote the
financial soundness of employee benefit plans. One such provision is
the prohibition of the assignment or alienation of plan benefits. Sec-
tion 206(d) of ERISA requires that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alien-
97. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
98. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
99. Id. at 660.
100. Id
101. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
102. Id at 666.
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ated."'' 1 3 This provision, which is also made applicable to all qualified
plans under section 401(a)(13) of the Code,' °4 restates a pre-ERISA
Code provision which similarly prohibited the assignment or alienation
of retirement benefits under private tax-qualified pension plans. 05
This federal interest in protecting the retirement income of retirees
and the overall integrity of pension plan benefits has come into conflict
with the states' interest in their domestic relations law. Most of the case
law relating to pension plans and preemption of state law by ERISA
has involved the conflict between these two interests.
2. The California Challenge. Community Property Princ iles for
Allocating Spousal Rights. Even before the California Supreme Court's
decision in In re Marriage of Brown, 0 6 holding that non-vested as well
as vested pension benefits are community property subject to division
in a marriage dissolution proceeding, the conflict between state com-
munity property principles and a federal prohibition of the assignment
of retirement benefits had become a central issue in California domes-
tic relations cases.
California courts have been generally unwilling to follow the
Supreme Court's holdings in Wissner and Free. In In re Marriage of
Fithian°7 the California Supreme Court distinguished Wissner and
held that Armed Forces retirement pay was subject to division under
community property principles. The court stated that Wissner had "no
controlling impact on the case at bar except to mandate us to examine
the legislative goals behind the military retirement pay system."' 08 Be-
cause the court refused to find California community property law "ir-
reconcilable" or "incompatible"' 0 9 with the military retirement system,
it held that characterization of such retirement benefits as community
property would not conflict with the beneficiary designation provision
of the federal law." 0
The California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Hisquierdo"'
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
104. Section 401(a)(13) of the Code similarly provides in part that "[a] trust shall not consti-
tute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
105. See the regulations at 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-2 (1978), which prohibit the diversion of plan
funds for any purpose other than the exclusive benefit of employees and their beneficiaries. The
IRS based its pre-ERISA prohibition against the assignment or alienation of plan benefits on
these provisions.
106. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
107. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
108. Id at 598, 517 P.2d at 452, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
109. Id at 601, 517 P.2d at 454, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
110. Id at 601, 517 P.2d at 454-55, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
111. 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), rev'd sub nom Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 99 S. Ct. 802 (1979). The California Supreme Court's decision was, however, subse-
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held that a prohibition of assignment or alienation of benefits payable
under the Railroad Retirement Act" 12 did not preclude a state divorce
court from awarding such benefits in a dissolution decree according to
community property principles. The court characterized the Wissner-
Fithian dichotomy by saying:
[W]henever there is a conflict between a federal statute affording an-
nuity or insurance benefits and state community property laws the
federal statute must prevail. However, if the intent of Congress in
creating the federal right is not violated by application of California's
community property laws, then the status of such rights is governed
by California law. 1 3
The court found that the federal prohibition of the assignment of rail-
road retirement benefits was not intended to apply to the claims of the
spouse, and therefore did not conflict with community property princi-
ples. "[The essential purpose of. . .[the prohibition against the antic-
ipation of payment was] to bar creditors of the beneficiary from
reaching annuity payments, rather than to prevent a spouse from vindi-
cating her ownership interest in the pension."11 4
It should be noted that neither Fithian"' nor Hisquierdo1 6 in-
volved a direct award of retirement benefits from a plan to a divorcing
spouse. These decisions required only that retirement benefits be in-
cluded in the divisible community property. Neither court ordered a
directing payment from the retirement plan; rather both ordered the
employee to make payments pursuant to the dissolution decree, after
receiving the benefits.
A concept frequently cited in California marriage dissolution ac-
tions involving retirement benefits protected by a prohibition of antici-
pation is the notion that community property principles require merely
quently reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that benefits payable under the Railroad
Retirement Act could not be divided under community property law. The Court held that the
provision of the Railroad Retirement Act which prohibited the assignment or alienation of bene-
fits barred the community property claims of a divorcing spouse. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976). It is
important to note that the Court found that the prohibition against the assignment or alienation of
benefits contained in the Railroad Retirement Act did not apply to any alimony or child support
claim, since Congress, in amending § 459 of the Social Security Act, intended to make an excep-
tion to § 23 1m and similar provisions in all other federal benefit plans. 99 S. Ct. at 811. See the
discussion of § 459 of the Social Security Act as amended in note 172 infra. See also Hipsley v.
Hipsley, 161 N.J. Super. 119, 390 A.2d 1220 (Ch. Div. 1978), in which the New Jersey Superior
Court, Ocean County, Chancery Division held that pension benefits under the Railroad Retire-
ment Act were not subject to equitable division.
112. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (Supp. V 1975).
113. 19 Cal. 3d at 616, 566 P.2d at 225, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
114. Id at 617, 566 P.2d at 226, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
115. 10 Cal. 3d at 604, 517 P.2d at 457, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
116. 19 Cal. 3d at 617-19, 566 P.2d at 227-28, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
406 [Vol. 1979:383
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
an allocation of property rights, not a prohibited assignment."17 The
non-employee spouse in a community property state may be viewed as
owning a share of any retirement benefits at the time such benefits are
earned or accrued. A division of retirement benefits pursuant to a di-
vorce decree would, therefore, be a mere allocation of pre-existing
property rights, not an assignment of rights prohibited under section
206(d) of ERISA.
Even if the section 206(d) prohibition of the assignment or aliena-
tion of benefits does not apply to the interest of a divorcing spouse in a
community property state, certainly an order directing a retirement
plan to pay benefits to a non-employee spouse would "relate to" an
employee benefit plan as contemplated by section 514.118 However, the
state law would be preempted only "insofar as" it relates to the retire-
ment plan. Thus, preemption would not reach the state statute; rather,
it would be limited to an application of state community property prin-
ciples requiring direct payment from a retirement plan to satisfy the
property interests of a divorcing spouse.
Most courts in community property states have failed to recognize
the crucial limitation on ERISA preemption created by this "insofar
as" language." 9 The California courts have viewed efforts by a plan to
117. See, e.g., Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1970). Phillpson is often cited in community property states for the proposition that a division
of community property interests constitutes no more than an allocation of pre-existing benefit
rights. In Phillpson the- Supreme Court of California denied the application of a state statute
prohibiting assignment of state employees' pension benefits and permitted a division of a state
employee's retirement benefit pursuant to a marriage dissolution decree. The court held that a
divorcing spouse "claims not as a creditor, but as an owner with a 'present, existing, and equal
interest.' [Citation omitted]. The recognition of an ownership claim cannot be described as the
levy of execution, garnishment, attachment or assignment of property." 3 Cal. 3d at 44, 473 P.2d
at 772, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 68. While Philloison represents yet another case in which a prohibition of
the assignment of benefits was held not to prevail against the claim of a divorcing spouse, it should
be noted that this case did not involve a claim of preemption under a federal statute. Moreover,
while the court in Phil/4son permits an award of benefits to a divorcing spouse that would take
into account retirement benefits, the court suggests that such an award need not be enforced di-
rectly against a retirement plan: "[A]I parties agree, and we concur, that if the community mus-
ters sufficient assets to do so, the preferable mode of division would be to award the pension rights
to the employee and property of equal value to the spouse." 3 Cal. 3d at 46, 473 P.2d at 774, 89
Cal. Rptr. at 70.
118. A court order requiring a direct payment of benefits from a plan to a non-employee
spouse "relates to" a plan within the meaning of § 514 by prescribing the manner and method in
which benefits are paid under the plan, subjects clearly regulated by the provisions of ERISA. For
example, ERISA frequently requires that benefits be made available in the form of a joint and
survivor annuity, that benefit payments begin no later than 60 days following the close of the plan
year in which an event such as retirement or termination of service occurs, and that lump sum
distributions may be made either voluntarily or involuntarily upon an employee's termination of
employment only if certain conditions are met.
119. Courts in non-community property states have also failed to recognize the importance of
the "insofar as" language of § 514. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, [1978] 177
Vol. 1979:383]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
resist a direct order of payment to a non-employee spouse as an attack
on basic community property principles that, if preempted, would leave
a void in state domestic relations laws. So, for example, a California
state court in In re Marriage of Sommers 2° permitted the joinder of a
pension plan in a divorce action, stating that "[d]eferred compensation,
accrued pensions, annuities to take place in the future, and social secur-
ity, veterans' and insurance benefits are well recognized property rights
and are properly the concern of courts upon the severance of the mari-
tal relationship."' 21 In addition, in both Pardee v. Operating Engineers
Pension Trust'22 and Southern California IBEW-NECA Pension Plan v.
Superior Court,'23 the Federal District Court for the Central District of
California refused to preempt California community property law, not-
ing its unwillingness to involve federal courts in traditional matters of
state domestic relations.' 24 Citing Pardee, the court in Southern Cali-
fornia stated that "if it were necessary to reach the merits, this court
would hold that the state court correctly determined that [ERISA] was
not intended to preempt or interfere with community property laws."' 125
Another example of a refusal to apply section 514's "insofar as"
language to distinguish between preemption of state community prop-
erty laws and preemption of the application of such laws is Judge Ren-
frew's decision in Stone v. Stone.'26 In that case a non-employee
spouse sought to enforce a division of marital property which had been
previously made pursuant to a divorce decree issued by a California
superior court. The marital dissolution decree which had divided the
couple's marital property under California community property law
awarded the wife a forty-percent interest in the retirement benefits pay-
able each month to her husband under the pension plan maintained by
PENS. REP. (BNA) D-1 (E.D. Mich. 1976), in which the court held that a Michigan statute that had
been interpreted as permitting assignments and attachments of pension and retirement benefits
conflicted with and was superseded by ERISA § 206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). The court went
on, however, to deny that ERISA § 514 compelled a finding of preemption because, in the court's
view, the relationship between the Michigan law and retirement plans "is too indirect and tangen-
tial." [1978] 177 PENS. REP. at D-2. The court feared that a finding of preemption would result in
the overruling of "all state law on all subjects that might have some peripheral connection with
employee benefit plans." Id The "insofar as" language in § 514 could, however, be interpreted as
requiring preemption only of any application of the state law which requires a direct payment of
benefits from a retirement plan and thus relates to and affects employee benefit plans.
120. 53 Cal. App. 3d 509, 126 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1975).
121. Id at 515, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
122. 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
123. [1976] 105 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-18 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
124. See, e.g., Pardee, 408 F. Supp. at 669.
125. [1976] 105 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-18 (dicta).
126. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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the Pacific District of the Seafarers International Union. 27 After al-
most three years of noncompliance with the divorce decree, the nonpar-
ticipant former spouse sought to enforce her judgment against the
retirement plan, seeking a court order requiring the plan to pay her
share directly to her each month. Defendants removed the action to
federal court and Judge Renfrew found federal jurisdiction under sec-
tion 502(a)(1) of ERISA,128 which permits a plan participant or benefi-
ciary "to recover benefits. . . to enforce his rights ... or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Judge Renfrew
stressed that once pension benefits had been awarded under a commu-
nity property allocation pursuant to a divorce decree, a former spouse
would have a very difficult time enforcing these property rights without
a finding of jurisdiction to sue the plan directly under section 502 of
ERISA:
To deny a nonemployee spouse awarded benefits in a divorce action
the right to sue under § 502(a)(1)(B) leaves her dependent on the
willingness of her spouse to sue the plan or its trustees on her behalf,
which the spouse has little or no incentive to do.129
After finding federal jurisdiction to enforce the divorced spouse's claim
against the pension plan, the court then examined the issue of federal
preemption in the context of both section 206(d) and section 514 of
ERISA. With respect to section 206(d), the court found that that provi-
sion should not apply to a transfer of pension benefits pursuant to com-
munity property rights and that "it]he payment of benefits to a
nonemployee spouse in satisfaction of her community property claim
does not conflict with the purposes of § 206(d)(1). Members of the
families of employees are included in the class which ERISA pro-
tects. 13
0
With respect to section 514, the court assumed that a finding of
preemption would result in a complete invalidation of the state's com-
munity property law with respect to employee benefit plans. It was
with this erroneous belief in mind that Judge Renfrew declared that
preemption would "involve a much more radical disturbance of 'the
federal-state balance'" than could have been intended by Congress.13 1
Pardee, Southern California and Stone balanced the federal inter-
ests served by ERISA's prohibition of the assignment or alienation of
127. Id at 920.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1976).
129. 450 F. Supp. at 922. But see National Bank of N. America v. Local 533 Pension Fund of
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 463 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (federal courts restricted standing to
sue under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to employee participants and designated beneficiaries); Kerbow
v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
130. 450 F. Supp. at 926.
131. Id at 932.
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retirement benefits against the state's interest in preserving its exclusive
authority over domestic relations matters. When these two interests are
counterposed, the state's argument is appealing. However, as a result
of section 514's "insofar as" language, it is not the state's broad interest
in its domestic relations law, but rather a much narrower state interest
in a particular application of that law, which is to be balanced against
the federal interests in uniformity of regulation and integrity of plan
assets.
In Francis v. United Technologies Corp.,32 the defendants success-
fully urged a very narrow preemption of a single application of Califor-
nia's community property principles. In that case, a divorcing non-
employee spouse brought an action against the employer maintaining
the pension plan in which her husband was a participant, the plan's
trustee and the plan's insurer/administrator. She sought a declaratory
judgment of her community property interests in the pension plan and
the creation of a constructive trust on her behalf. Judge Poole, writing
for the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California,
cited Wissner with approval and granted defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court held that "ERISA has preempted the opera-
tion of so much of California's community property laws as purport to
give a non-employee spouse an interest in the plan benefits,"1 33 and
that the plaintiff had no cause of action under section 502 of ERISA 1 34
3. The New York Challenge: The Right to Support Becomes the
Issue. Judge Renfrew's statement in Stone that section 206(d) of ER-
ISA should not be interpreted to bar the claims of an employee partici-
pant's spouse or other dependents because "[m]embers of the families
of employees are included in the class which ERISA protects,1 35 re-
flects a theme frequently repeated in New York and several other com-
mon law jurisdictions. In these jurisdictions it is the state's interest in
the familial support obligation traditionally borne by the family's ma-
jor wage earner, rather than the state interest in the division of marital
property, which is raised as a response to federal preemption.
Prior to ERISA, both state and federal courts had been reluctant
to hold that a federal provision exempting retirement benefits from as-
signment or alienation could prevail against the alimony or child sup-
132. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
133. Id. at 86.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976). Federal jurisdiction in Francis was founded on diversity of
citizenship. Judge Poole specifically rejected the view that the plaintiff divorcing spouse could be
viewed as a "participant" or "beneficiary" entitled to bring an action in federal court under § 502
of ERISA. Accord, Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
135. 450 F. Supp. at 926.
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port claims of the employee's dependents. As Judge Rutledge noted in
Schlaefer v. Schlaefer:136
[T]he usual purpose of exemptions [from the assignment or aliena-
tion of pension benefits] is to relieve the person exempted from the
pressure of claims hostile to his dependents' essential needs as well as
his own personal ones, not to relieve him of familial obligations and
destroy what may be the family's last and only security, short of pub-
lic relief.13
7
In Brown v. Brown,138 an Ohio state court refused to dissolve a
previously issued order against the husband of a divorcing spouse re-
straining the disposition of the proceeds of a social security check pend-
ing a petition for divorce and alimony. The court held that a wife's
alimony claim was distinguishable from that of a creditor and was,
therefore, unaffected by the provision of the Social Security Act 139
which exempts Social Security benefits from assignment or aliena-'
tion.140 The court found the purpose of that prohibition on assignment
to be the protection of both the recipient of Social Security benefits and
those dependent on him. 14
1
Similarly, both state and federal courts in common law property
states have distinguished the claims of wives and other dependents
from those of general creditors within the context of ERISA's section
206(d) prohibition against the assignment or alienation of benefits. In
Cody v. Riecker,4 2 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of New York held that section 206(d) and the provision of a pension
plan prohibiting the assignment or alienation of benefits pursuant to
section 206(d) could not bar an execution upon pension benefits to en-
force a support obligation. In that case the Family Court of the State of
New York had issued a judgment for arrears on a retired employee
spouse's obligation of support; the judgment was enforced by levying
on the employee spouse's pension plan. The plaintiff trustees of the
plai brought an action to enjoin the levy, based on section 206(d) of
ERISA. The court held that section 206(d) could not be interpreted so
as to bar the enforcement of a husband's support obligation to his wife,
and cited Stone for the proposition that Congress could not have in-
136. 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
137. Id at 185.
138. 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852 (1972).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-432 (1976).
140. Id. § 407.
141. "The intent behind the exemption in the Social Security Act is to protect the appellant
and those dependent on him from the claim of creditors. Appellee's claim for alimony, different
from a claim of a creditor, is unaffected by the exemption set forth in section 407:' 32 Ohio App.
2d at 141, 288 N.E.2d at 853-854.
142. 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'd, [1979] 230 PENS. REP. (BNA) D-22 (2d Cir. 1979).
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tended such a radical encroachment on traditional state interests: "[A]
Congressional intent to pre-empt state law in such a matter is not
lightly to be presumed in the absence of an unambiguous declaration of
intent."1 43 Lacking clear legislative history in ERISA regarding pre-
emption of the state-created support obligation, the court in Cody
chose to follow the line of cases'" which has traditionally "afforded
deference" to this state interest. 45
In Cartledge v. Miller, 46 the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of New York adopted the position urged by the Justice Depart-
ment in its amicus brief on behalf of the Secretaries of Labor and the
Treasury. The government approach would create an implied excep-
tion from the prohibitions of section 206(d) in the case of court-issued
support orders. In Cartledge, the County of Rockland, on behalf of the
Rockland County Department of Social Services, had obtained a court
order garnishing the pension benefits of a retired participant to fulfill
support obligations owed to his wife and to pay arrearages which had
been assigned to the county by the participant's wife in return for pub-
lie welfare received by her. 14 7 The pension committee that adminis-
tered the participant's plan sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
state court order as an invalid assignment or alienation of pension ben-
efits.
Judge Weinfeld refused to infer federal preemption from section
206(d) in the absence of clear legislative history providing guidance as
to the scope of ERISA's prohibition of assignments and prescribing
preemption of state support laws.' 48 Regarding preemption generally,
the court found the state's interest in enforcing familial maintenance
and support obligations to be weightier than the "generalized proscrip-
tions"'t49 of ERISA's section 514. In fact, the court in Cartledge argued
143. 454 F. Supp. at 24.
144. See, e.g., Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940); In re Bagnalli Guardian-
ship, 238 Iowa 905, 29 N.W.2d 597 (1947); Brown v. Brown, 32 Ohio App. 3d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852
(1972); Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d 668
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
145. 454 F. Supp. at 24.
146. 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
147. The plan participant had failed to meet his support obligation to his wife and children for
almost twenty years prior to his retirement in 1977, at which time his arrearages under prior
orders were substantial. In 1977, a New York Family Court issued a payroll deduction order for
amounts to be withheld from the participant's pension benefit to satisfy the amounts owed to the
County Department of Social Services. Id at 1150.
148. "As a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, courts have presumed that the
basic police powers of the States, particularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not
superceded [sic] by federal legislation unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress." Id at 1154 (footnote omitted).
149. Id
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that "the goals underlying ERISA support the reasoning of this com-
mon law presumption" 50 in favor of state enforcement of familial obli-
gations. Citing from the legislative history of ERISA, the court noted
Congress' concern for the
"continued well-being and security of millions of employees andtheir
dependents [who] are directly affected by these plans. . . ." Rather
than intending to undermine the family law rights of dependent
spouses and children, the legislature was concerned that "employees
and their beneficiaries"-the entire family-be protected by ER-
ISA.15 1
Thus, the court refused to adopt a literal reading of section 206(d)
and section 514 of ERISA, which would preempt state laws enforcing
familial support obligations. The traditional interest of the state in do-
mestic relations matters so fundamental as the security of family de-
pendents was held. to outweigh generalized federal interests in the
absence of very specific congressional language mandating a contrary
result. 152
Other decisions in non-community property states have similarly
upheld the obligation of a bread winner to support his dependents. In
Cogolos v. Cogollos 153 and Wanamaker v. Wanamaker,154 two New
York state courts held that ERISA's section 206(d) could not insulate
an employee spouse from valid support claims which represent a tradi-
tional and longstanding interest of the state.155  In Wanamaker the
court found that the "spouse is not a creditor. . . .Her position is that
of one who is seeking her natural and statutory rights as a former
wife." 1 56 Like the court in Cartledge, the Wanamaker court pointed to
the Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy in section 1 of
ERISA 157 as evidence that ERISA itself recognizes the right to support
150. Id at 1156.
151. Id (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied by court).
152. See also AT&T v. Merry, 26 F.R. Serv. 2d 877 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the Second Circuit
cited Cartledge and Cody in finding an implied exception to ERISA's prohibition of assignment or
alienation in the case of court-ordered family support obligations.
153. 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
154. 93 Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Fain. Ct. 1978).
155. See also the decision of the Family Court of the State of New York in In re M.H. v.J.H.,
93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Faro. Ct. 1978), which held that a child support order requir-
ing a payroll deduction from the monthly pension benefits of a retiree was not superseded by
ERISA. The court pointed out that the pension plan's prohibition against the assignment or alien-
ation of benefits which was required under § 206(d) of ERISA was intended to protect the family
from outsiders rather than to help one member of the family avoid his support obligations.
156. 93 Misc. 2d at 787, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
157. The Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy, ERISA § l(a) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976)), states in part
that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans. . .[and that] it is desirable in the interests of employ-
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and the necessity to promote the continued well-being of both employ-
ees and their dependents. 58 Similarly, in Cogollos the court rejected a
federal preemption argument urging that section 206(d) prohibits a di-
rect order deducting alimony support payments from the monthly pen-
sion benefits payable to a divorced employee. "The Court does not
believe Congress intended to create a privileged sanctuary, behind
which a delinquent husband or father can thumb his nose at conced-
edly valid and outstanding support orders."'159
4. The Problemfor Plan Administrators anda Possible Resolution.
Against this backdrop of recent court decisions concerning the interac-
tion of state domestic relations law and ERISA, the dilemma of the
plan administrator faced with a court order awarding benefits from a
retirement plan to a non-employee spouse must be examined. Most of
the problems relate to (1) possible tax disqualification of the plan for
failure to comply with the prohibition of assignment in section 401 of
the Internal Revenue Code; (2) potential fiduciary liability for failure
to comply with the "exclusive purpose" requirement of section 404 of
ERISA or with the terms of the plan; and (3) a number of technical
issues which could arise from the conflicting requirements of a court
award and specific provisions of both the Code and ERISA.
As noted above, 60 section 206(d) of ERISA and Code section
401(a)(13) require that a retirement plan include a provision prohibit-
ing the assignment or alienation of plan benefits. If a payment to a
non-employee spouse, pursuant to court order, is viewed as a prohib-
ited assignment or alienation of benefits, a plan administrator's failure
to comply with this plan provision could result in the disqualification of
the plan. In Cartledge, the Internal Revenue Service, through the ami-
cus brief filed by the Department of Justice on behalf of the Secretaries
of Labor and the Treasury, concluded that Congress intended to ex-
empt family support decrees from the general prohibition of assign-
ment and alienation in section 401(a)(13) of the Code. 16 1
ees and their benVFciaries... that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with
respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans.
(Emphasis added.)
158. 93 Misc. 2d at 787, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 704-05.
159. 93 Misc. 2d at 408, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
160. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
161. 457 F. Supp. at 1156. The IRS took the same position in an amicus brief filed by the
Justice Department on behalf of both the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury in AT&T v.
Merry, No. Civ. B-78-161 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 1978), afj'd, 26 F.R. Serv. 2d 877 (2d Cir. 1979)
(discussed supra, note 152).
The Department of Labor, with the acquiescence of the IRS, has taken the concept of an
implied exception to § 206(d) of ERISA one step further in its amicus brief filed in Stone v. Stone,
450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In that brief the Department took the somewhat inconsistent
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In contrast to the Service's position in Cartledge, Merry and Stone,
regulations under section 401(a)(13) of the Code are phrased very
broadly so as to prohibit "[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement (whether
revocable or irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant
or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to,
all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become,
payable to the participant or beneficiary." '162 At the present time, this
apparent conflict between the explicit language of the IRS regulations
and the position taken by the IRS in amicus briefs has not been re-
solved. 163 Thus, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the
continued tax qualification of a plan acquiescing to a garnishment by a
divorcing spouse.
A plan administrator's failure to comply with a plan provision
prohibiting the assignment or alienation of benefits could also result in
a breach of the fiduciary responsibility requirements of section 404 of
ERISA. 1 4 That provision requires, among other things, that a plan
fudiciary such as a trustee or administrator "discharge his duties with
respect to a plan . . in accordance with the documents and instru-
ments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of this Subchapter."165  Thus, a court
order requiring a plan administrator or trustee to pay benefits directly
to a non-employee spouse could force the administrator to choose be-
tween compliance with the plan provisions, as required by ERISA, and
position that § 514 of ERISA should be read on its face as preempting the application of commu-
nity property principles to the benefits payable under an employee benefit plan, while at the same
time urging an implied exception to the 206(d) anti-assignment provision of ERISA in the case of
a court decree attaching benefits of a participant in pay status to satisfy a claim under state com-
munity property law. In footnote 16 of the brief, the Department stated that the Department of
the Treasury subscribed to that portion of the brief which deals with the implied exception to
ERISA § 206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1979).
163. Moreover, it should be noted that the national office's position with respect to an implied
exception to the I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) prohibition against assignment or alienation may not neces-
sarily be followed by each of the IRS district offices, which have original jurisdiction over matters
involving issues of qualification under I.R.C. § 401(a). In a letter to Robert Sone of IBM, dated
June 1, 1976, the IRS national office noted that the district offices have original jurisdiction over
questions of plan qualification and further noted a plan's best remedy against a potential garnish-
ment of retirement benefits may be found under ERISA § 514. However, in a subsequent letter,
dated September 8, 1978, to John Whittlesey on behalf of Union Carbide Corporation, the IRS
national office stated that an implied exception to I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and the regulations thereun-
der has been found in the case of enforcement of family support decrees. This letter points out
that although neither ERISA nor its legislative history makes any distinction between a garnish-
ment proceeding to satisfy the claim of an ordinary creditor and a proceeding to satisfy a family
support order, "Congress intended an implied exception for family support orders in a case of a
pensioner whose right to receive benefits is vested and who is actually in pay status."
164. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
165. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
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compliance with the court order, which may be backed by the contempt
authority of the court.
Also among the fiduciary obligations imposed by section 404 is the
"exclusive purpose" requirement, which provides that "a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan. .. (A) for the exclu-
sive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan."' 66 The participant employee spouse could allege that any reduc-
tion in his benefits under the plan due to compliance with a court order
resulted from a violation of the fiduciary's sole obligation to plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries.
Another question that will face a plan administrator who has re-
ceived a court order requiring the payment of benefits is the extent to
which a domestic relations court may award relief inconsistent with the
terms of the plan or of ERISA. As is true with the possibility of plan
disqualification, the administrator is put between the rock of fiduciary
breach and the hard place of noncompliance with a court order. Thus,
for example, what should a fiduciary do if a court: (1) awards more
than the amount payable to the participant under the plan, e.g., the
award assumes that the participant will receive a single life annuity
and, in fact, the participant remarries and receives a reduced periodic
payment by virtue of the plan's joint and survivor provisions; (2)
awards a benefit payable in a form which is not an optional form of
payment under the plan, e.g, a lump sum when the plan provides only
for an annuity; (3) awards a benefit to be paid immediately when the
plan provides that benefits will be paid only upon a participant's retire-
ment or termination of employment; or (4) awards the right to exercise
plan options even though the plan provides that only participants may
exercise such options?
ERISA in section 205167 and the Code in section 401(a)(1 1) require
that any plan offering a benefit in the form of an annuity must provide
a "qualified joint and survivor annuity." A "qualified joint and survi-
vor" annuity is defined as
an annuity for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity for
his spouse which is not less than one-half of... the amount of the
annuity payable during the joint lives of the participant and his
spouse and which is the actuarial equivalent of a single life annuity
for the life of the participant. 168
In the case of a participant, a portion of whose retirement annuity has
166. Id § l104(a)(1).
167. Id § 1055.
168. Id § 1055(g)(3); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(G)(iii).
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been attached by a domestic relations decree, and who has since remar-
ried, the plan may be put in the impossible position of complying with
both the joint and survivor requirements of ERISA and the domestic
relations judgment.
Some possible conflicts between a court award of benefits to a non-
employee spouse and the technical requirements of ERISA and the
Code may vary depending on whether the plan is a defined benefit or a
defined contribution plan. 169 Under a defined benefit plan, a grant of
rights to a non-employee spouse, which is not subject to any forfeiture
provisions that the plan may have, could upset the plan's actuarial as-
sumptions that assume certain rates of forfeiture. 170
Recent court decisions apparently carving out an implied excep-
tion to sections 206(d) and 514 in family support cases, despite ER-
ISA's broad and specific preemption mandate, have left the state of the
law in marital dissolution cases very confused. It is most likely that
Congress simply did not consider the issues raised by a potential con-
flict between ERISA and state domestic relations law. Although Con-
gress did recognize the importance of excepting certain state laws from
federal preemption, particularly in the case of welfare plans where pre-
169. Under a defined contribution plan, other than a money purchase plan, an award of bene-
fits to a non-employee spouse could conflict with IRS regulations which require that, in the case of
a profit-sharing plan or stock bonus plan, forfeitures under the plan be allocated among the ac-
count balances of the other plan participants. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(l)(iii) (1979). In the case of
a money purchase plan, forfeitures may be used to reduce the employer's contributions to the
plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-7(a) (1979). Forfeitures may not inure to the benefit of a terminated or
deceased employee but must be allocated to the accounts of the remaining plan participants. Thus
an allocation of a portion of a participant's account balance to a non-employee spouse may violate
the IRS forfeiture regulations if the employee spouse subsequently forfeits his benefit rights under
the plan.
A profit-sharing plan which provides for the withdrawal of accrued vested benefits by a par-
ticipant who remains in employment may also face unique problems in the event of a court award
of benefits to a non-employee spouse. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (1979), a profit-sharing
plan could provide for a distribution of benefits upon fulfillment of conditions specified in the
plan, such as a showing of hardship by the participant. In the case of an outstanding court order
awarding benefits to a non-employee spouse as of the retirement or termination of employment of
a participant, it is uncertain whether benefits could be distributed to the participant spouse prior to
termination of employment in accordance with the plan provisions.
170. Thus, for example, in the case of a plan which provides for a complete forfeiture of an
employee's accrued vested benefit in the event of his death before reaching retirement or early
retirement age under the plan, compliance with a court award of benefits that could otherwise
have been forfeited by a deceased employee could violate a plan's actuarial assumptions.
Under ERISA § 302(c)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(3) (1976)) and I.R.C. § 412(c)(3) a
plan must use actuarial assumptions which are reasonable; the plan's actuary must make an an-
nual certification as to the reasonableness of the actuarial assumptions used by the plan under the
requirements of ERISA § 103(d)(8) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d)(8) (1976)). It is not certain
whether a forfeiture of benefits which is based on the life of the non-employee spouse rather than
the participant spouse, as in the case of a nonforfeitable future award of benefits pursuant to a
court order, could be considered a reasonable actuarial assumption.
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emption would leave a regulatory vacuum, it may not have foreseen the
interface between pension plan regulation and state property laws. 17
We would suggest, therefore, that section 514 of ERISA be
amended to save from preemption an application of state law that seeks
to enforce familial support obligations. 17  We recommend that a new
section (b)(5) be added to section 514 to read: "(5) This section shall
not be construed to supersede the application or enforcement of any
state law which imposes a legal obligation to provide child support or
to make alimony payments." Pension benefits in pay status would thus
be made subject to garnishment or attachment pursuant to a state court
award of either alimony or child support.
Congress should make clear, however, that garnishment would not
be permissible to accomplish an equitable division of marital property
absent a support or alimony decree. It is a garnishment of pension ben-
efits expected to be received, rather than benefits actually in pay status,
that does the most violence to the purposes and specific provisions of
ERISA. An attachment of benefits that are no more than a future ex-
pectancy gives rise to the dilemma of plan fiduciaries described
above. 17 It is, therefore, not the theory of community property which
creates problems for retirement plans, but rather the application of that
theory so as to compel a direct payment from a plan to a non-employee
spouse who has no traditionally understood status as a plan participant
or beneficiary. ERISA compels a finding of federal preemption of this
application of state law.
On the other hand, enforcement of a state support decree poses no
such threat to the federal statute's purpose. Support is a concept based
171. The ERISA Improvements Act of 1979, S. 209, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., does, however,
address specifically the potential conflict between federal pension regulation and state property
law which has arisen since the enactment of ERISA. The bill amends § 206(d) to exclude from the
prohibition of assignment or alienation any marital property decree, alimony or child support
judgment which does not require a pension plan to alter the effective date, timing, form, duration
or amount of any benefit payments under the plan or to honor any election which is not provided
under the plan or which is made by a person other than a participant or beneficiary, as defined in
ERISA. Section 514 would also be amended to save from preemption domestic relations decrees
and alimony or child support orders to the extent permitted by the exception to § 206(d).
172. It should be noted that this treatment of court orders enforcing the familial support obli-
gation has already been adopted with respect to Social Security benefits. Section 459 of the Social
Security Act permits the garnishment of civil service retirement benefits to enforce court orders for
child support and alimony. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-30, §§ 501(a),
501(b), 91 Stat. 157 (1977)). In 1977, Congress added to the Social Security Act a definitional
statute, § 462(c), which relates to § 459 and limits "alimony" to its traditional meaning of spousal
support. That statute states that alimony does not include "any payment or transfer of property or
its value by an individual to his spouse or former spouse in compliance with any community
property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between
spouses or former spouses." Pub. L. No. 95-30, Tit. V, § 501(d), 91 Stat. 160 (1977).
173. See text accompanying notes 164-68 supra.
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both on the needs of the beneficiaries of the principal wage earner and
on the wage earner's ability to provide those needs. 174 Thus, the sup-
port concept focuses on the present income stream of the principal
wage earner. Because the focus of support is on the amount of income
received by, or the total wealth of, the principal wage earner, the
problems associated with dividing a property interest of uncertain and
potentially fluctuating value are avoided.
Moreover, the human concerns that appear to have motivated the
courts that have ruled on the question of retirement plan garnishment
in domestic relations cases are not generally present in property settle-
ments. '75 In marital dissolution actions that do not involve a support
or alimony decree, the divorcing parties often are able to allocate ex-
pected pension plan benefits that are properly part of the marital estate
to the employee spouse, and other assets, sufficient to satisfy the non-
employee spouse's claim to retirement benefits, to the non-employee
spouse. 176
IV. CONCLUSION
Preemption issues by their very nature require a balancing of state
and federal interests. The outcome of that balancing will often depend
upon which state interest is cited as the major one against which the
174. The Supreme Court opinion in Hisquierdo also noted the distinction between a support
decree and a division of marital property in its discussion of the congressional intent manifested in
the recent amendments to the Social Security Act:
We know, however, that the purpose of§ 459 was to help children and divorced spouses
get off welfare. It is therefore logical to conclude that Congress, in adopting § 462(c),
thought that a family's need for support could justify garnishment, even though it de-
flected other federal benefit programs from their intended goals, but that community
property claims, which are not based on need, could not do so.
99 S. Ct. at 811.
175. See, for example, the concerns for the welfare of the employee spouse's dependents ex-
pressed by courts in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Cartledge v. Miller, 457
F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct.
1978); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784,401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Fain. Ct. 1978); and Brown
v. Brown, 32 Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852 (1972).
See also Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), an action which reflects many of
the compelling characteristics of typical support cases. The divorced spouse in Stone could have
brought a traditional support action in lieu of an action to enforce the divorce decree.
176. A number of cases have in fact suggested that a division of property which awards retire-
ment benefits to the employee spouse and other assets to the non-employee spouse is a preferable
method of dividing marital property. Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court stated in
Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 46, 473 P.2d 765, 774, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 70
(1970): "All parties agree, and we concur, that if the community musters sufficient assets to do so,
the preferable mode of division would be to award the pension rights to the employee and prop-
erty of equal value to the spouse." See also In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 133, 528
P.2d 1145, 1147, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1974); Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal.
3d 461,473-74, 492 P.2d 13, 21-22, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d
889, 192 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972).
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federal interest is balanced.
ERISA is no exception to this rule. Although ERISA appears to
give courts a clear statement of both specific preemption language and
congressional intent, judicial decisions have shown that further clarifi-
cation may be needed. While the courts have generally done well in
balancing state interests against the congressional objectives expressed
in ERISA, some decisions have pointed up the lack of congressional
clarity with respect to certain traditional areas of state law. Thus, the
insurance proviso and the deemer clause, which appear to deal with the
interface between insurance and employee benefit plans, may raise
more questions than they resolve. These issues require a reevaluation
of the federal goals expressed in both the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
ERISA-a reevaluation and balancing of competing federal policies
that should properly be conducted by Congress, not by the courts. The
line of cases relating to state pregnancy disability laws raises similar
questions under the language of section 514; these, too, should properly
be answered by Congress.
In the retirement plan area, most of the cases have dealt with a real
or apparent conflict between state and federal laws. The conflict may
be only apparent, as in the juxtaposition of community property laws
with sections 206(d) and 514 of ERISA, where the "insofar as" lan-
guage of ERISA, properly interpreted, may be read to preempt only a
narrow afpplication of the state law and not the state's broader interest
in division of marital property. The conflict between the language of
ERISA and state law may be real, however, as in the case of state court
support and alimony decrees. The courts have generally reached the
just conclusion in these cases, but have been forced to stretch the plain
meaning of the federal statute to do so. Because the result reached by
the courts in these cases does violence neither to the administration of
ERISA nor to congressional purpose, Congress should give serious
consideration to adopting an amendment to ERISA exempting the en-
forcement of alimony or support obligations from preemption.
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